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Introduction 
 
  There is broad consensus among policy makers that training is important for 
employment, productivity and individual well – being. Yet applied economists have 
long recognized that estimating the wage returns to training is complicated by the 
fact that selection into training is not random, and that assignment to training is 
correlated with unobserved individual ability. Since ability affects earnings, a 
simple regression of earnings on training fails to identify a causal effect. The 
predominant approach adopted by the empirical literature so far has been to use a 
fixed effects estimator to correct for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity.  
Approaches based on instrumental variables have not been as popular, mainly 
because it is difficult to find plausible exclusion restrictions (Frazis and Lowenstein, 
2006; Lee, 2005). Yet theoretical models provide some guidance for the selection of 
instruments. For instance, a property of the by now standard model of training in 
imperfect labour markets by Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, is that training subsidies 
affect training directly but wages and the probability of employment only indirectly, 
via their effects on training. In this paper, we exploit this property and use regional 
training policy – which consists of planned training subsidies and grants – to study 
the causal effect of training on the earnings. We consider only formal and 
continuing vocational training, which takes place after completion of full time 
education and labour market entry.   
By  planned  subsidies we mean the invitations to tender issued by regional 
governments and the resources allocated for training expenditures in regional 
budgets. Compared to actual training expenditures, which are affected by the 
decisions of individuals and firms, planned expenditures are more likely to reflect 
regional training policies.  
Regional training policies in support of continuing vocational training have been 
implemented in Italy since the mid 1990s, when Objective 4 of the European 
Training Fund (budget period 1994-1999) introduced measures to help workers 
adapt to industrial change and to changes in production systems. This measures 
included vocational education, re-training, guidance and counselling, and affected 
Italian regions differently, because the Southern regions covered by Objective 1   4
were excluded. Starting with 1997, Italian national law added new measures in 
support of training (Laws 236 and 53), which were funded by payroll taxes and 
managed with increasing autonomy by regional governments. 
The different policy priorities of each region, as well as the differences in the 
ability to spend available resources – especially between the North and the South of 
Italy - have generated significant variations both across regions and over time in the 
real resources per head allocated to continuing vocational training. We exploit these 
variations to estimate the wage returns to training in Italy during the years 1999 to 
2005. 
We collect data on Italian regional training policies from their onset in 1994 to 
2005 and compute for each region and year the cumulated sum of real planned 
training subsidies per head. We merge these data with a longitudinal dataset which 
covers the years 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 and provides information on individual 
monthly earnings, the number of formal training episodes experienced during the 
relevant reference period and a rich set of individual controls. We use this and 
retrospective information to compute a measure of individual training stock that is 
more satisfactory than the simple measure of training incidence which is often used 
in this literature.  
We instrument this stock in a standard earnings function with the (lagged) sum 
of real planned subsidies per head. We find that regional training policy has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the individual training stock. There is 
also evidence that the selected instrument is not weak. However, the size of the 
estimated effect is small: we find that one additional real euro per head devoted to 
training subsidies by regional governments from 1994 to year t-1 has increased the 
discounted training stock in year t by 0.61 to 0.68 percent, depending on the 
specification. Ceteris paribus, these estimates suggest that in order to increase the 
average training stock by 10 percent, regional governments would have to allocate 
to training incentives an additional sum of 17 real euros per head, a 30.8 percent 
increase with respect to the sample average.  
When we treat the training stock as exogenous, we find that adding one week of 
training in year t increases average monthly earnings in the same year by 0.5 to 0.7 
percent, depending on the specification. When we instrument the training stock with   5
the (lagged) stock of training grants, we find that the marginal effect of a week of 
training on current earnings is much higher, and ranges between 3.5 and 4.4 percent. 
However, this effect declines rapidly over time and is about 20 percent of its initial 
value ten years after the investment. When we consider a 20 years period, the 
average marginal return to an additional week of formal training is at most 1.35 
percent.   
These estimated returns are local average treatment effects and suggest that the 
individuals who change their training because of changes in training grants enjoy 
relatively high returns that dissipate rapidly over time. We ask whether these returns 
vary with observable characteristics, such as age, education, gender and firm size, 
and find evidence that they are significantly higher for the employees of small firms 
(with less than 100 employees). Small firms typically train less than large firms, 
because they lack the resources or the necessary facilities (see Bassanini et al, 
2007). Since the marginal returns to training decline with the quantity invested, 
additional investments induced by training subsidies are bound to pay off more at 
the margin for workers of small firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the literature; in 
Section 2 we discuss training subsidies in the Acemoglu and Pischke model of 
training. Our empirical approach is discussed in Section 3, and Italian training 
policies are reviewed in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data, Section 6 presents 
our results and Section 7 includes some robustness exercises. Conclusions follow. 
  
1. Review of the Literature  
 
  Estimating the effects of work related training on wages is fraught with 
difficulties. Perhaps the most obvious is that the allocation of training to individuals 
is not random but subject to choice. The existing empirical literature has addressed 
this problem using three approaches: a) Heckman style correction for selection into 
training; b) instrumental variables; c) fixed effects estimates. Good reviews of these 
approaches include Frazis and Lowenstein, 2006, Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2008¸ 
and Bassanini et al, 2007. Parametric selection models need to make potentially 
restrictive assumptions on the distribution of un-observables. They share with the   6
second approach the difficulty of finding credible exclusion restrictions, or variables 
that affect training participation without directly affecting wages or selection into 
employment (see Lee, 2005). The last approach removes permanent individual 
effects from the estimating equation. However, this method effectively eliminates 
the source of endogeneity in training participation or intensity if this is due to time 
invariant individual effects. When the wage growth experienced by individuals 
receiving training is different from that experienced by untrained individuals, fixed 
effects estimators fail to recover the causal effect of training on wages
1.  
Estimated private returns to workplace training tend to vary substantially in the 
empirical literature. Relatively low returns are found by Lynch, 1992, who uses the 
US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and estimates that one week of training 
raises (hourly) earnings by 0.2 percent. Similarly, Parent, 1999, finds that one year 
of training raises earnings by 12 percent. Assuming that one year corresponds to 48 
weeks of training, this implies a return for a week of training equal to 0.25 percent. 
Higher returns are found by Frazis and Lowenstein, 2006, who estimate that a 
median training spell of 57 hours (about one and a half week of training) yields a 
wage return of 2.3 percent. Bartel, 1995, uses company data and finds that one day 
of training increases wages by 2 percent.  
Blundell et all, 1996, report that having done one employer provided training 
course which leads to a higher vocational qualification increases the earnings of 
British males by close to 15 percent for off – the – job training and by close to 12 
percent for on – the – job training. These returns fall to 6.6 and 6.3 percent for 
training spells that do not lead to a qualification. Booth, 1993, uses British data and 
finds that one week of training in the first year of the job increases earnings by 1 
percent. Veum, 1995, uses the NLSY as done by Lynch, but for a different period of 
time. His fixed effects estimates imply that one additional hour of training raises 
(hourly) wages by 0.7 to 0.9 percent. After reviewing this evidence, Leuven and 
Oosterbeek, 2008, conclude that “.. the literature often finds returns of at least 3% 
for a week of private-sector training..” (p.424). In comparison, one year of 
additional full time education yields a 10 percent return. 
 
                                                 
1 Pischke, 2001, takes this into account by estimating fixed effects wage growth equations.   7
2. Earnings and Training in the Presence of Training Subsidies: an Illustrative 
Model 
 
In this section we introduce training subsidies in the by now standard Acemoglu 
and Pischke model of investment in general training in imperfectly competitive 
markets (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). A key feature of this model is that firms 
operating in markets with imperfections may be willing to bear the cost of training 
even if the imparted skills can be transferred to other firms. This is in line with the 
empirical evidence (see Bassanini et al, 2007).  
Consider a two-period setup. In period 1 the employer trains the employee and 
pays the training costs
2. Let the investment in training be denoted by τ.  In period 2 
the employer and worker either separate or continue their match. In the latter case, 
they bargain over the wage  ) ( w  and production  ) ( f y   occurs. Denote with 
) ( v  the worker’s outside option. Labour market frictions imply that ) ( ) (   v f  . 
The match is affected at the start of period 2 by a negative productivity shock 
) , 0 (
2   N  , and continues if       ) ( ) ( w f . Letting G be the distribution 
function of the shock, the probability of being employed in period 2 is equal to 
 ) ( ) (   w f G q   .  
If the match continues, the wage is bargained between the parties. Assuming 
Nash bargaining and a zero outside option on the firm side, the outcome of the 
bargain is  
 
 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (      v f v w            [ 1 ]  
 
where β is the worker’s bargaining power. Importantly, the wage does not depend 
on training costs, because these are bygones at the time of the bargain. 
  In the first period, the firm decides the investment in training to maximize real 
profits  
 
                                                 
2 Training costs are born by employers when workers are credit constrained. Acemoglu and Pischke show 
that firms are willing to pay these costs even when workers are not credit constrained. The key 
implications of the model for the purposes of this paper do not change if the training cost is born by the 
employee.   8
        s c v f q      ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (       [ 2 ]  
 
where c is the training cost function and s is the training subsidy per unit of training. 
Optimal training  ) , (    s   is increasing in the training subsidy and decreasing in 
the worker’s bargaining power
3. In the absence of training subsidies, the employer is 
willing to train and pay the training costs only if there is wage compression 
( ) 0 ) 0 ( ) 0 (
' '  v f . With training subsidies, training can be funded by the employer 
even without wage compression.  
The model has the following implications for the empirical analysis. First, the 
training subsidy s affects earnings only by affecting the investment in training. 
Second, the probability of employment q is affected by training subsidies only 
because the latter influences training. Third, heterogeneity in the costs and returns to 
training generate heterogeneous training investments. The model suggests that 
omitting the training subsidy s from the wage equation in the empirical analysis is a 




3. Our Empirical Approach 
 
We consider the following empirical model 
 
irt irt W rt W irt r t W irt T Q X w              
' ' ln      [4] 
 
irt rt T rt T irt r t T irt TS Q X T              
' '      [5] 
 
where κ is a constant,  t   and  r   are time and regional dummies, X is a vector of 
individual controls, Q a vector of region by time variables, w is monthly real wages, 
T the stock of training, TS the stock of training subsidies (at constant prices), ε and v 
are errors,  0 ) , (  t t Cov   , and the subscripts i, j and t are for the individual, the 
                                                 
3 The first order conditions are  0 ) ( ' ' ' )] ( ) ( )[ 1 ( )] ( ) ( )[ 1 (         s c v f v f g q           9
region and time respectively. We include in the vector X individual age, age 
squared, a gender dummy, parental education dummies, education, occupation 
(white collar jobs) and industry dummies (industry and agriculture dummies), a part 
time and a firm size dummy (equal to 1 if the employer has less than 100 employees 
and 0 otherwise). 
  The standard ordinary least squares estimates of parameter θ, which captures the 
marginal effect of training on earnings, is likely to be biased for at least two reasons: 
a) the individual training stock is correlated with unobserved ability; b) there is 
measurement error in the training stock, which induces attenuation bias. 
Measurement error can occur if individuals fail to recall short training spells and 
concentrate their reporting only on longer spells.  
In this paper, we address non random allocation to training and measurement 
error by using instrumental variables. The key exclusion restriction is that the stock 
of training subsidies does not affect earnings directly, but only via the stock of 
training. This restriction can be violated in the presence of contextual effects that 
influence both earnings and training subsidies. This can happen if richer regions 
have both higher wages and can afford to spend more to subsidize training. We 
control for region and time specific contextual effects with regional and time 
dummies. Regional dummies are expected to control also for the quality of training 
investment, which depend on existing facilities – such as regional training centres - 
and varies slowly over time. The inclusion of these dummies implies that the effect 
of training incentives TS on the training stock T can be identified only if the former 
vary both over time and across regions. We document this variation in the next 
section of the paper.  
We include in the empirical specification the (lagged) regional rate of 
unemployment and the (lagged) regional share of high tech industries. These 
variables pick up both regional labour market dynamics and variations in the 
importance of research and development, which is higher in high tech sectors. 
Omitting these variables may cause the orthogonality condition to fail if region by 
time variations in the stock of training incentives are correlated with the dynamics 
of the labour market and the industrial structure.    10
Temporary negative shocks that affect wages in a single region can induce 
regional governments to subsidize training more. To avoid reverse causality (from 
lower wages to higher incentives), we use the lagged stock of training incentives 
and rely on the fact that the speed of response of regional governments to temporary 
shocks is unlikely to be fast.  
  Since selection into employment (and non-negative wages) is not random, a 
potential concern is that the regional stock of training incentives affects this 
selection process directly rather than only indirectly via the training stock. To check 
for this possibility, we estimate a probit model of employment participation, using 
the regressors in equation [4] and adding the lagged stock of training incentives, but 
find no evidence that the latter have a statistically significant effect. Another 
concern is that the selected instrument is correlated with unobserved ability. This 
seems unlikely, however, given the time invariant nature of ability and the fact that 
we are using the region by time variation in training subsidies. Furthermore, our 
choice of using planned rather than actual training subsidies should guarantee that 
our instrument is predetermined with respect to the allocation of training funds to 
firms and employees.   
 
4. Continuing Vocational Training Policies in Italy  
 
  In Italy, government subsidies to continuing vocational training are managed by 
regional authorities. Public intervention is organized along three lines: 1) the 
European Social Fund (ESF); 2) national measures (Laws 236/93 and 53/00) and 3) 
industry based training funds (ITF), managed by social partners
4. By and large, 
these measures are funded by the European Community (Objectives 1 and 3, 
directives D1 and D2 during the financial period 2000 to 2006 and Objective 4 
during the financial period 1994 to 1999) and by a compulsory levy of 0.30% on 
national payroll (see the Appendix for further details). We estimate that, during the 
period 1994-2005, about 3.37 billion euro at constant prices have been allocated by 
regions to support continuing vocational training and individual training plans, with 
                                                 
4 Since training funds became operational from the second half of 2004 and our sample ends in 2005, we 
ignore them for the purposes of this paper.    11
2.7 billion euros funded by the European Social Fund and the rest from the levy on 
national payroll
5.  
  These resources are transferred from the Community and the national 
government to regional authorities, which allocate them to regional budgets, issue 
invitations to tender and fund successful applicants. In this paper we use planned 
expenditures (“impegni”) rather than training outlays (“spese”): the former are 
invitations to tender, the latter are actual expenditures. Plans and outlays can differ 
in a given fiscal year either because some grants are not awarded or because there 
are delays between awards and expenditures. In an effort to curb these delays, the 
European Commission has introduced in 2002 the so called “n+2” rule, which forces 
regional authorities to spend the allocated resources within 2 years from the award.  
Italian regions have substantial discretion and autonomy in the management of 
training funds. Importantly, there is no explicit rule requiring that the funds received 
by the national government in a given fiscal year are to be allocated to regional 
budgets or spent within the same period. While some regions have managed to issue 
invitations to tender a few months after receiving their funds, other regions have 
either not been able or have decided not to do so. The Labour Ministry has 
repeatedly threatened regions which have delayed the budgeting of allocated 
resources with the withdrawal of funds, but no effective action in this direction has 
ever been taken (see ISFOL, 2006).  
  Table 1 shows for each Italian region – with the exclusion of tiny Val d’Aosta 
and Molise – the cumulated value of planned expenditures per head at 2005 prices 
and by source of funds
6. In the first column we consider the European Social Fund 
and in the second column the resources provided by national laws. There is 
substantial variation across regions, with Puglia in the South spending the least 
(about 22.6 euros per head) and Trentino Alto Adige in the North spending the most 
(about 286.7 euros per head). These differences reflect both the lower employment 
rate in the South and the lower ability to spend of Southern Italian regions
7. The 
                                                 
5 Additional training policies during this period include a tax deduction scheme for training expenditures, 
which operated in 2001 and 2002. This national policy is controlled in our empirical setup by time 
dummies. 
6 The value per head is obtained by dividing real expenditures by active population in the region. 
7 Since the allocation of resources for training purposes from the national government to regions is based 
on employment, Southern regions receive less because of their lower employment rate.   12
North – South divide is not sufficient, however, to account for cross regional 
differences: for instance, the resources per head allocated to training by Lombardia, 
the richest region, and Sardinia, a relatively under-developed Southern region, are 
very similar. Furthermore, there is no evidence that regions which plan to use 
relatively less the training incentives from national sources compensate by using 
more intensely the resources received from the European Social Fund. If anything, 
Table 1 shows that the two sources of funds are complements, not substitutes.  
  Figure 1 shows how the cumulated value of planned training subsidies per head 
varies over time across regions, after normalising to 1 the cumulated value in the 
year 1998. Clearly, there is no common trend. Figure 2 plots the average training 
stock in region i and period t against the lagged stock of training incentives in the 
same region and shows that the correlation is positive. Finally, when we decompose 
the total standard deviation of the cumulated stock of training incentives, we find 
that the within component (variation over time) is broadly similar in size to the 
between component (variation across regions). We conclude from this that the 
selected instrument exhibits useful variation both across regions and over time.  
 
5. The Data 
  
  We merge the regional data on training subsidies for the years 1998 to 2005 with 
individual panel data drawn from ILFI. The ILFI panel consists of five waves, with 
each wave being implemented every two years, starting with 1997 and ending with 
2005. In the first wave, the survey collects both current and retrospective 
information on the relevant events. In the follow-ups, data collection updates the 
initial information with additional events. The ILFI dataset is particularly well 
suited for the purpose of this paper because it contains information on (monthly) net 
earnings, the number of training episodes and several individual characteristics, 
including education and occupation
8. Since the first wave in 1997 does not include 
information on individual earnings, our sample starts from 1999. Additional 
information on this dataset is provided in the Appendix. 
                                                 
8 An alternative dataset is the Italian section of the European Community Household Panel, which covers 
the period 1994-2001. A drawback of this survey is that the available information on training includes 
mainly training incidence and considers only the last training course taken during the past 12 months.    13
In each wave of the survey, interviewed individuals are asked whether they have 
received any formal training during the reference period (two years) and the number 
of training episodes. Training includes any program organized by firms, local 
authorities and industrial associations that takes place after completion of upper 
secondary education and is not included in vocational tertiary education
9.  
  Even though the survey is every two years, we can construct for each individual 
annual data on training episodes, using the available information on the year and the 
month when each episode was started. We allocate to year t all training episodes that 
start in the year. We use these annual data to compute the training stock with the 
perpetual inventory method, taking advantage of the fact that in the initial wave of 
the survey individuals were asked to recall all their training episodes since labour 
market entry.  
  To implement this method we need a measure of human capital depreciation. 
Following Conti, 2005, and Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2006, we use in our 
baseline estimates a 15 percent depreciation rate, but experiment also with a lower 
rate (5 percent). The depreciation of human capital at the rate δ=0.15 per year 
implies that the ratio of the estimated impact of a training episode at time t on 
monthly wages at time t+n to the impact of the same episode on contemporaneous 
wages is n 85 . 0.   
  In order to avoid having region by year cells with too few observations, we 
aggregate the original 18 regions into 13
10. In the aggregated regions, the stock of 
training subsidies is a weighted average of regional data, using active population in 
each region as weight. We restrict our original sample by: a) including only 
individuals aged 20 to 55 who are employed in the private sector; b) excluding 
individuals with missing data on earnings; c) excluding the very few individuals 
(less than 2 percent of the sample) who have changed region of residence during the 
sample period.  
In the selected sample, the average undiscounted sum of training episodes during 
the period 1999 to 2005 is 0.933 (with a minimum of zero and maximum of 25 
                                                 
9 We distinguish this type of training from informal training, which is mainly on – the – job. 
10 The remaining regions are: Piemonte, Lombardia, Trentino Alto Adige and Veneto, Friuli Venezia 
Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Liguria, Marche and Umbria, Lazio and Abruzzi, Campania, Puglia, 
Basilicata and Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna.   14
episodes), which increases to 2.269 for the sub-sample who have had at least one 
training episode since labour market entry (41.14 percent). The discounted sum is 
lower, at 0.339 and 1.038 respectively.  Table 2 shows the undiscounted sum for 
each of the 13 regions. It turns out that both the sum of training episodes and the 
percentage of employees receiving any training from labour market entry to 2005 is 
highest in Friuli Venezia Giulia – a Northern region – and lowest in Campania, a 
Southern region. Interestingly, the most economically advanced region in the 
country, Lombardia, lags behind most of the Northern regions in terms both of 
training episodes and of trained employees. The data about Lombardia may seem 
puzzling. Notice however that the low training incidence in this region is in line 
with the information provided by alternative datasets. If we use the European 
Community Household Panel, for instance, we find that the percentage of workers 
in the private sector receiving any training during the last year was only 3.9 percent 
in Lombardia in 2001, compared to 8.9 percent in the North-East, 6.5 percent in 
Emilia Romagna and 4.6 percent in Lazio
11.  
  For each individual in the sample we have information on monthly earnings
12, 
years of schooling, occupation, type of contract, firm size and sector of activity. The 
panel is unbalanced, with 50 percent of individuals present in all waves, 20.7 
percent present in three waves and the rest present in one or two waves. The final 
sample consists of 1928 employees and 4850 observations. Table 3 presents the 
summary statistics for the key variables in 2005.     
 
6. The Main Results 
 
 
The specification of equation (4) postulates a linear relationship between log 
earnings and the training stock, measured as the discounted sum of training episodes 
from labour market entry to current time. Frazis and Lowenstein, 2006, however, 
argue that a better fitting specification should have the cube root of the training 
stock rather than the stock itself. With a cube root specification, the marginal returns 
                                                 
11 The relatively low training intensity in Lombardia is also confirmed by the PLUS 2005 survey carried 
out by ISFOL (the Italian Training Institute). 
12 Unfortunately the number of hours worked in waves later than the first is asked only to respondents 
who have changed their job.   15
to training decrease with the invested stock, a plausible assumption. Following their 
suggestion, our baseline specification has the cube root but we also present results 
with the linear specification
13.  
  Table 4 shows the estimates of the first stage equation (5). The table is organized 
in four columns: while the former two columns are based on a larger sample which 
comprises all annual data on training stocks and training incentives and spans the 
period 1998 to 2005, the remaining two columns are based on the smaller sample 
with data on earnings, which covers the odd years from 1999 to 2005. In each pair 
of columns, the former uses the cube root of the training stock as the dependent 
variable and the latter the training stock.   
Since the training stock and the stock of incentives are at different levels of 
aggregation, we cluster the standard errors by region and year. In all the four 
columns, we find that the lagged stock of training incentives has a positive and 
statistically significant effect (at least at the 5 percent level of significance) on the 
training stock. This effect is very similar in the larger and in the smaller sample. 
These estimates suggest that one additional (real) euro per head spent in training 
subsidies increases the discounted training stock by 0.6 percent, a small effect.  
If the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable is low, the 
instrument is “weak”. To identify weak instruments, Staiger and Stock, 1997, 
proposed to examine the F-statistic on the inclusion of the instrument in the first 
stage regression. An F-statistic of less than 10 is indicative of weak instruments. 
When the instruments are many and weak, the 2SLS estimate of the effect of 
training on wages is biased toward the probability limit of the corresponding OLS 
estimate (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). When the model is just-identified, as in our 
case, 2SLS estimates are median – unbiased but imprecise. Table 4 shows that the 
F-test is above the threshold value of 10 in the first three columns and below 10 in 
the last column. Since the 2SLS estimate of the returns to training is based on the 
smaller sample, these results suggest that we should focus on the specification of 
equation (4) which uses the cube root of the training stock. 
The training stock is higher among the better educated, those working in a white 
collar job and in larger firms. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that part-timers in the 
                                                 
13 We find that the goodness of fit is marginally higher with the cube root specification.   16
largest sample are more likely to receive training. This effect, however, is 
statistically insignificant in the smaller sample. The result is less surprisingly when 
we realize that the part-timers in our sample are younger and better educated than 
average. Moreover, they tend to be employed in the service sector.  
There is some evidence that an increase in the regional unemployment rate is 
associated to an increase in the training stock. This counter-cyclical pattern is not 
new in the literature, see for instance Bassanini and Brunello, 2009. On the other 
hand, the training stock tends to increase in regions where the percentage of high 
tech firms rises, although this effect is in most cases imprecisely estimated. This 
negative relationship might seem surprising. Yet it is consistent with the evidence of 
lack of complementarity between R&D and training expenditures (see Ballot, 
Fakhfakh and Taymaz, 2001, and Bassanini and Brunello, 2009).  
Table 5 presents both the random effects and the random effects two stages least 
squares estimates of the impact of the training stock on log earnings, when the 
former is instrumented with the lagged stock of training grants. In the table, the first 
and third columns refer to our baseline specification with the cube root of the 
training stock, and the remaining columns are based on the log – linear 
specification. In all specifications there is evidence that the training stock has a 
positive and statistically significant (at least at the 5 percent level of confidence) 
effect on log monthly earnings. Evaluated at the sample mean, the marginal effect of 
one additional current training episode when this is treated as exogenous is 3.2 
percent with the cube root specification and 2.1 percent with the linear specification. 
When the training stock is treated as endogenous, the marginal effect raises to 18.6 
percent in the cube root specification and to 14.9 percent in the linear model
14.  
While the ILFI dataset contains information on the number of training days 
spent in each training episodes, this variable has several missing values and cannot 
be used meaningfully in a regression analysis. With this drawback in mind, the 
average duration of a training episode is 21.07 days, which broadly corresponds to 
four weeks, and the wage return per week ranges from 3.5 to 4.4 percent, depending 
                                                 
14 The estimates show that log earnings are concave in age, higher for males, the better educated and  
those working as white collars, and lower for part – timers and workers in small firms. There is also 
evidence that wages decline with regional unemployment and increase with the share of high tech firms in 
the region.    17
on the specification. The rather long duration of the training episodes includes in 
this dataset could be partly responsible of the relatively high returns, as we expect 
that shorter courses yield lower returns. 
The estimated marginal returns to training are high, but broadly in line with the 
empirical literature. It is important to stress, however, that these returns measure the 
impact of a current week of training on the current wage. The effect on future wages 
declines rapidly and is about 20 percent of the impact effect 10 years after the initial 
investment (see Figure 3). Over a period of 20 years, the average marginal return to 
an additional week of formal training is 1.35% at most.  
What is the expected wage return of an additional euro allocated to training 
grants? Since one additional euro in incentives increases the training stock by 0.6 
percent, the percentage increase in earnings is 0.11 percent, which corresponds to 15 
euro on an annual basis (13 months of pay). Under the null assumption that changes 
in government subsidies do not affect the decision rules of workers and firms, 
monthly earnings can be increased by 1 percent if training grants per head rise by 
about 9 euro.  
With heterogeneous returns, the 2SLS estimate does not measure the average 
treatment effect, but only the local average treatment effect, which corresponds to 
the return accruing to the individuals in the sample who have changed their training 
because of variations in the selected instrument (compliers). In general, this effect 
differs from the average effect both on the treated (those who have positive training 
stocks) and on the non-treated (those with zero training stocks), and from the 
average treatment effect. Since the marginal effect of training could vary with 
observable characteristics, we experiment with interactions of the training stock 
with gender, age, education and firm size. Only in the last case, however, we find 
evidence of significantly different effects (at the 10 percent level of confidence).  
Table 6 shows our estimates when equations (4) and (5) include interactions of 
both training and training incentives with a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has less 
than 100 employees and to 0 otherwise. In either regression, the coefficients of the 
interacted effects are statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. 
We find that the elasticity of training to training grants is positive and marginally 
higher among firms with more than 100 employees. We also find that the marginal   18
effect of an additional current training episode is about twice as large for employees 
of small firms (5.4 percent) than for employees of large firms with at least 100 
employees (2.4 percent). As discussed above, this effect declines sharply over time 
for both types of firm (see Figure 4).  
Typically, small firms lack both the resources and the facilities to invest in 
training and train significantly less than larger firms. Policies that induce firms and 
workers to invest in additional training are likely to produce higher returns in 
smaller firms because the marginal benefits to training are decreasing in the quantity 
of training. An additional factor that could help explain our results is that larger 
firms have higher bargaining power and can extract higher profits from their training 
investments than smaller firms, which may be more exposed to the poaching threat, 
and therefore need to pay higher wage premia to retain their trained employees. 
  
7. Robustness and extensions 
 
Some of the variables included in vector X of equation (4) are clearly 
endogenous (education, firm size, occupation, industry, part time). When we 
estimate the earnings equation by instrumental variables and treat only the training 
stock  TS as endogenous, the failure to account for the endogeneity of other 
regressors will bias the IV estimate of the effect of T on log earnings if the 
instrument  TS is correlated with the additional endogenous variables (see the 
Appendix for details). We test whether this is the case by regressing TS on each 
potential endogenous variable (excluding T), after partialling out the common set of 
exogenous variables. Since we cannot reject the null of no correlation at the 5 
percent level of confidence for all variables but the firm size dummy, we replicate 
our estimates in Table 5 by omitting this dummy, with marginal changes on the 
coefficients of interest
15.  
Our measure of the training stock emphasizes the number of training episodes 
but overlooks their quality. The time invariant component of quality is picked up by 
the regional dummies. The residual time varying component, however, could be 
correlated with training incentives if the availability of funds for training induces 
                                                 
15 The marginal return to training increases slightly in this specification.   19
employers and employees to substitute quantity for quality. It seems plausible to 
assume that quality is related to the duration of training courses. We can use the data 
on training duration available in the dataset to check whether average duration 
increases or decreases when the stock of training incentives varies. When we do so, 
we find no evidence of a statistically significant relationship. We conclude from this 
that, conditional on regional dummies, our inability to control for training quality is 
unlikely to distort our IV estimates.  
It is much more difficult to control for the effects of informal training. Suppose 
that firms and employees engage both in formal and in informal training. An 
increase in the availability of training subsidies can induce agents to substitute one 
type of training for another, for instance to increase formal training – as we find in 
this paper – and reduce informal training. If this is the case, our IV results under-
estimate the wage returns to training. If instead agents increase both their formal and 
their informal training, the estimated effects discussed in this paper over-estimate 
the true effect. This is an important issue, but one we can do very little about, as 
informal training is very hard to measure
16. 
  We have estimated equation (5) using a linear model in spite of the fact that the 
dependent variable is either positive or zero. This is not a problem for 2SLS 
estimates, which remain consistent when the first stage equation is specified as 
linear even when it is nonlinear (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In this section, we 
verify whether our baseline results are affected when we allow for nonlinearity in 
the first stage equation. Using the undiscounted training stock, we treat our 
dependent variable as count data with over-dispersion (variance higher than the 
mean) and estimate (5) with a negative binomial specification. Next, we compute 
the fitted values from the first stage and use them as instrument of the un-
depreciated training stock. As shown in Table 7, we find that the lagged stock of 
training grants affects positively the training stock, but that the estimated elasticity 
(0.127) is less than half of that reported in Table 4. We also find that the marginal 
effect of week of training on current earnings is equal to 3.3 percent, not far from 
the estimates reported in Table 5. 
                                                 
16 See Pischke, 2007.   20
  Finally, we replicate the 2SLS estimates in Table 5 when the depreciation rate 
used to compute the training stock is 5 rather than 15 percent. As shown in Figure 3, 
the impact effect is lower (below 4 percent) but the effect on future earnings 
declines less sharply and remains above 1 percent 20 years after the original 
investment.  
    
Conclusions  
 
  In this paper we have used an instrumental variables approach to estimate the 
wage returns to training. The key idea is that regional training policies affect 
training investments and decisions but have no direct effect on earnings and the 
probability of employment. Using Italian data, we have found that regional training 
policies have a statistically significant impact on individual training. The size of this 
effect, however, is small: one additional euro per head spent in training subsidies in 
the average Italian region – which corresponds to more than 3 million euro at 
constant prices - increases the average (discounted) stock of training by a mere 0.6 
percent.  
The marginal effect of an additional week of training on monthly earnings is 
instead sizeable and equal to 3.5 to 4.4 percent. However, due to the depreciation of 
human capital, this effect declines over time. Over a period of 20 years, the average 
marginal effect is much lower and equal to 1.35 percent. We have shown that these 
returns – which capture local average treatment effects – are larger in small firms 
than in large firms. Our interpretation of this result is that small firms and their 
employees are more likely to be constrained in their training investment decisions 
by the lack of resources and facilities. Because of this, they usually train less. 
Therefore, if the marginal benefits of training decline with training intensity, 
policies that induce individuals and firms to train more are likely to yield higher 
marginal returns in small than in large firms.  
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Appendix 
 
1. Funding continuing vocational training in Italy 
 
In this appendix we describe the funding of continuing vocational training (CVT), or the 
training which takes place after labour market entry. Vocational education and training are 
administered in Italy at a regional level under the supervision and guidance of the central 
government since 1977-78, when the Presidential Decree 616/77 and Law 845/78 were 
implemented. These laws provide the basic framework for public intervention in the area of 
vocational training. Resources are funded with 0.30% of compulsory contributions paid by 
firms to INPS (National Social Security Institute) as insurance against involuntary 
unemployment (normally 1.61% of payroll), and placed into a common fund (The Single 
Fund for Training, which co-finances the revolving fund for access to the EU Structural 
Funds), to which Regions have access to finance vocational education and training. We 




Law 236/93, which contains urgent measures to support employment, established 
vocational training as a tool of active labour market policy. The law was enacted in 1993 
but the first allocation of training resources from the Ministry to regional authorities was in 
1997. These resources were devoted mainly to the training of trainers and to company 
training plans. Eligibility for company plans was restricted to employees in firms which 
paid insurance against involuntary unemployment. Funds were allocated to co-finance 
approved projects, and applying firms were supposed to pay at least 20 percent of the total 
training cost. Each firm could apply for a maximum of 50 million liras.  
The procedure to apply and obtain funds can be briefly summarized as follows: each 
region produces invitations to tender, to which eligible firms could apply.  From 1997 to 
2001 these invitations were issued simultaneously by regions, and funds were allocated on 
demand until the end of the fiscal year or until exhaustion of the allocated resources. The 
distribution of funds to regions was done by the national government, and the key criterion 
was the number of employees in each region. Applications were evaluated (not in a 
comparative way) and priority was given to projects which involved the social partners 
(union and employer associations). Funding was on a first come first served basis.  
We distinguish between regional invitations to tender and actual regional expenditures 
to fund CVT. While the former reflect mainly local political decisions on the allocation of   22
resources, the latter are also a function of applications by firms and individuals. In this 
paper, we use invitations rather than expenditures as a measure of the resources allocated by 
regions in a given year to fund CVT. 
Starting with 1997, the distribution of funds among the 19 Regions and the 2 
Autonomous Provinces
17 was made on an annual basis by the Ministry of Labour Act 
(“Circolare”), which established the amount and the rules. The initial allocation for 
company training plans was close to 32 million euros (1997 prices). Act 37/98 in the 
following year gave to the regions the opportunity of using up to 25 percent of the assigned 
resources to fund individual rather than company training. This possibility was confirmed 
also by Act 139/98 (published at the very end of 1998 and thus imputed to 1999 in our 
database). Act 30/2000 established that all resources not allocated by a region within the 
next 2 years were to be redistributed among other regions. However, the threatened 
redistribution never took place. The first panel of Table A1 list the Acts implemented during 
this period. 
The large majority of regions (15) decided to use 25% of the received funds to finance 
individual training projects. Each region was free to choose both the selection mechanism 
and the delivery of funds: some regions introduced a voucher paid directly to training 
centres; other regions created a catalogue of courses among which applying workers could 
choose. Following this experience, a new law was enacted in 2000 (Law 53/00), which 
allowed the systematic funding of individual training plans. As in the case of Law 236, 
since 2000 the Ministry allocated funds to regions on an annual basis.  
At the end of 2000 (imputed to 2001 in our database) a new Act (92/00) was issued to 
allocate training funds to regions to finance training plans with an industrial or local 
content
18. These plans were complex training actions devoted to the promotion of training in 
a specific geographical area or in a specific sector of economic activity. Social partners 
played an active role in planning, programming and implementing these actions.  
In January 2001 Law 288/00 came into force. With this law, the government established 
industry based training funds (“fondi paritetici interprofessionali per la formazione 
continua”). These funds were managed by representatives of employees and firms rather 
than by regional authorities, with the aim of financing company, sector and regional training 
plans. They started to deliver subsidies at the end of 2004.  
                                                 
17 The regions are: Valle d’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia 
Romagna, Toscana , Umbria, Lazio, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, 
Sicilia e Sardegna.The autonomous provinces are Trento and Bolzano. 
18 A national experiment with these plans took place in 1999 with Act 65/99, which funded 70 projects 
among 568 applications.   23
A watershed in the management of regional training funds is 2001, when Constitutional 
Law 3/01 increased the empowerment of regions, which were assigned exclusive 
responsibility for vocational education and training. The major novelty in the area of CVT 
was that the funds allocated by the national government could be used by region with full 
autonomy in the invitations to tender, which were published in the official regional 
bulletins. The government explicitly asked regional administrations to favour the integration 
of each training action with similar actions funded by ESF.  
For the purposes of this paper, the greater autonomy enjoyed by regions meant greater 
heterogeneity in the time lag between allocation of national resources and the issue of 
invitations to tender. To give an idea of the time used by some regions to open the calls, we 
report in Table A2 the time lag in days between the national distribution of resources to 
regions and the regional calls, using data from ISFOL (2005). There is substantial 
heterogeneity in the ability to spend of Italian regions. For instance, by 2005 many Southern 
regions had not yet issued the calls for projects funded by the Ministry of Labour in 2003. 
Our data on planned subsidies are based on ministerial Acts until 2000 and from 2001 on 
the calls for tenders
19 published by each region on the official regional bulletin. 
 
The European Social Fund 
 
In the province of European Structural funds
20, only the European Social Fund finances 
continuing vocational training initiatives. According to the Framework Regulations 
(2052/88), the Structural Funds have the following priority goals: 
  Objective 1: structural adjustment of the regions with delayed development. 
Funds used: ERDF, ESF and the EAGGF-Guidance Section; 
  Objective 2: economic reconversion for declining industrial areas. Funds used: 
ERDF and ESF; 
  Objective 3: reduction of long-term unemployment and improvement of 
professional placement for young people and people excluded from the labour 
market; 
  Objective 4: support to industrial restructuring. Funds used: ESF; 
                                                 
19 This database is available on the web site www.eformazionecontinua.it  
20 The main European Structural funds are: the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), and the 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). 
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    Objective 5: promotion of rural development. Funds involved: EAGGF, 
Guidance section, FIFG. Structural adjustment of rural areas. Funds involved:   
EAGGF, Guidance section, ESF, ERDF. 
 
During the six-year programme from 1994 to 1999, training incentives funded by ESF 
involved only 14 regions of 20: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardy, the 
autonomous provinces of Bolzano and Trento, Veneto, Fruili Venezia Giulia, Emilia-
Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio and Abruzzo (only from 1997). These funds 
were mobilized under three multi-regional programmes run by the Ministry of Labour 
(Innovative Actions, Retraining and Requalification of Employees, System Reinforcement). 
The implementation of training programs funded by the ESF was rather heterogeneous 
across regions. We collect the data on planned regional expenditures at the regional level 
during the period 1994-1999 from the publication “Relazione annuale: i rapporti finanziari 
con l'Unione Europea e l'utilizzazione dei fondi comunitari” by Corte dei Conti, and from 
ISFOL annual reports.  
Turning to the 2000-2006 programming period, the European Social Fund was involved 
in the support of the European Employment Strategy, which consisted mainly in combating 
unemployment and developing human resources and social integration. Training incentives 
for the employed were funded under Directives D1 and D2. A database collecting 
information on regional training policy funded by the ESF was created at the Ministry of 
Finance (IGRUE) during this period. Our data on planned training expenditures for this 
period were kindly provided by ISFOL from the IGRUE database.  
 
2. The ILFI Dataset 
 
The ILFI panel consists of five waves, with each wave being implemented in an odd 
year, starting with 1997 and ending with 2005. In the first wave, the survey collects both 
current and retrospective information from more than 4000 Italian households. In the 
follow-ups, interviews update the initial information with additional events and collect all 
retrospective information for the newly interviewed. The questionnaire is designed to 
recover individual life histories from birth to the time of the interview, which are organized 
in episodes. The selected topics include geographical mobility, education and vocational 
training, work, social origins, and family structure. In the first wave all the significant 
events in the lives of the interviewed individuals were collected.    25
Table A3 shows the number of interviews in each wave. In 1997 households were 
sampled according to a two-stage stratified procedure. The primary sampling unit was the 
universe of Italian municipalities in 1996. The final sample consisted of 272 municipalities: 
the 12 metropolitan municipalities (selected with probability equal to 1) plus a random 
sample of 260 municipalities extracted with probability proportional to the number of 
residents from 30 strata defined by region and population size. The secondary sampling unit 
was the household: within each municipality a random sample of household was extracted 
and all the individuals in the household older than 18 were interviewed.  
The sample is representative of the Italian population at the regional level. A 
comparison of the main characteristics of this dataset with the 1997 wave of Indagine 
Multiscopo, a much larger national representative survey carried out by the national 
statistical institute (ISTAT), was run by Bernardi and Pisati (2003) – see Table A4. They 
find that the differences between the two surveys are very small. When we compare the 
1999 wave of ILFI dataset with the 1998 wave of the Survey on the Income and Wealth of 
Italian Households by the Bank of Italy, we find that the percentage of individuals aged 20 
to 55 and employment was 48.1 in the former dataset and 46.6 in the latter. Furthermore, the 
average net monthly wage was equal to 1109.2 (standard deviation 548.1) in the Bank of 
Italy dataset and to 1116.9 euro (standard deviation: 461) in ILFI.  
 
3. Instrumental variables when some explanatory variables are treated as exogenous but 
are endogenous 
 
Consider the following empirical model 
 
u X X y    2 2 1 1                    [ A 1 ]  
 
where  0 ) , ( 1  u X Cov  and  0 ) , ( 2  u X Cov . Assume that Z and W are the selected 
instruments. Then the normal equations are 
 
y W X W X W
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From which we get 
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Assume now that  2 X  is treated as exogenous, and let  NO
2   be the estimated parameter. 
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              [ A 5 ]  
 
Since  NO
2   is biased,  IV
1  is also biased if  0 ) ( 2
'  X Z Cov .  
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Table 1. Regional Planned Training Expenditures. Cumulated stock 1994-2005. Real Euros per 
Head. 







Lombardia 64.98    15.58 
Trentino Alto Adige  251.36           35.43 
Veneto 94.77    21.06 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  144.33    32.88 
Emilia Romagna  153.32    31.47 
Liguria 89.51    19.96 
Toscana 71.60    15.75 
Marche 62.66    16.82 
Umbria 104.14    23.52 
Lazio 61.48    16.63 
Abruzzi 68.96    19.86 







Calabria 18.12    7.36 
Sicilia 34.86    5.10 
Sardegna 69.27    15.74 
      
Source: see the Appendix 
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Table 2. Sum of Training Episodes and Percentage of Workers receiving any Training. By 
region. Year: 2005 
  Sum of 
training 
episodes 
  % of 
 trained 
      workers 










         2.419
Lombardia  0.725    0.355           2.042
Trentino Alto Adige and Veneto  1.362       0.514                 2.647 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  2.111    0.722                2.923 
Emilia Romagna  0.704    0.422           1.666 
Liguria  0.653    0.307           2.125 
Toscana  1.209    0.493           2.450 
Marche and Umbria  0.958    0.375           2.555 
Lazio and Abruzzi  0.982    0.377           2.604 
Campania  0.271    0.171           1.583 
Puglia 





         2.100 
         4.625 
Sicilia and Sardegna  0.557    0.285           1.950 
        
Source: see the Appendix   31
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Standard 
deviation 
    
Monthly earnings 





Age 37.56  9.30 
Gender (male=1)  0.61  - 
Year of Schooling  10.43  3.47  
White collar job  0.37  - 
Part timer  0.10  - 
Regional lagged unemployment rate  8.74  6.62 
Regional share of high tech industries 
Percentage of firms with less than 100 employees 
Parental background: at least one parent with upper sec 
education or more 
Number of observations 
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Table 4. First stage estimates – full sample and subsample with positive earnings. Private sector 
employees only. Dependent variable: cubic root of the training stock and training stock T. 13 
regions. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Full sample 
















        
Age 0.011***  0.018***  0.022***  0.033*** 
 [0.003]  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.009] 
Age squared  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Gender  0.003 0.030* 0.002  0.033 
 [0.010]  [0.015]  [0.013]  [0.024] 
        
Lagged incentives stock *100  0.155***  0.274***  0.156***  0.273** 
 [0.025]  [0.065]  [0.047]  [0.102] 
        
Regional unemployment rate   0.000  0.006*  0.002  0.010** 
(lagged) [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.005] 
% firms in high tech industries   -0.031***  -0.013  -0.021  0.006 
(lagged) [0.009]  [0.019]  [0.014]  [0.029] 
        
Education: ISCED<3  0.053***  0.052***  0.055***  0.063** 
 [0.009]  [0.016]  [0.013]  [0.025] 
Education: ISCED=3  0.145***  0.224***  0.156***  0.260*** 
 [0.011]  [0.023]  [0.018]  [0.040] 
Education: ISCED>3  0.256***  0.496***  0.263***  0.524*** 
 [0.022]  [0.054]  [0.035]  [0.080] 
White collar job  0.101***  0.088***  0.111***  0.092*** 
 [0.007]  [0.015]  [0.012]  [0.025] 
Part time job  0.039**  0.059*  0.022  0.059 
 [0.018]  [0.035]  [0.028]  [0.059] 
Firm with less than 100   -0.158***  -0.228***  -0.177***  -0.268*** 
employees [0.013]  [0.028]  [0.017]  [0.040] 













Observations 11495  11495  4850  4850 
R-squared 0.171  0.117  0.185  0.125 
Note: Clustered standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each regression includes a 
constant, regional, year and industry dummies, two parental education dummies and a dummy equal to 1 
if firm size is missing.   33
Table 5. Ordinary least squares and IV estimates. Dependent variable: log monthly real 
earnings. 13 regions. Years 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 






      
Age  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] 
Age  squared  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Gender  0.256*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 
  [0.015] [0.015] [0.029] [0.020] 
      
Training Stock (Cube Root)  0.047***    0.273**   
  [0.012]  [0.123]  
Training Stock    0.021***    0.149** 
   [0.006]  [0.060] 
      
Regional unemployment rate   -0.006***  -0.006***  -0.005**  -0.007*** 
(lagged)  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
% of high tech industries   0.037***  0.037***  0.023***  0.027*** 
(lagged)  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Education: ISCED<3  0.091***  0.093***  0.074  0.081** 
  [0.026] [0.025] [0.050] [0.035] 
Education: ISCED=3  0.153***  0.155***  0.133**  0.128*** 
  [0.029] [0.028] [0.060] [0.042] 
Education:  ISCED>3  0.389*** 0.390*** 0.357*** 0.336*** 
  [0.040] [0.040] [0.085] [0.063] 
White collar job  0.110***  0.113***  0.053**  0.086*** 
  [0.017] [0.017] [0.027] [0.022] 
Part  –  time  job  -0.384*** -0.384*** -0.364*** -0.377*** 
  [0.020] [0.020] [0.027] [0.024] 




[0.016] [0.016] [0.029] [0.023] 
Marginal effect of a current 
training episode 
Marginal effect of a current 

























Observations  4850 4850 4850 4850 
Note: standard errors in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each regression includes a constant, 
regional, year and industry dummies, two parental education dummies and a dummy equal to 1 if firm 
size is missing.   34
Table 6. Effect of incentives on training and IV estimates of the effect of the cube root of 
training on log wages. With interactions with firm size. 13 regions. 
 (1)  (2) 




    
    
Lagged incentives stock x 100  0.168***   
 [0.017]   
 
Lagged incentive stock x  
Firm size>100 dummy x 100 
 
 
      0.033*** 
[0.012] 
 
Lagged Training Stock 
 
 
Lagged Training Stock x 
Firm Size>100 Dummy  
 
Elasticity firms with less  
than 100 employees 
 
Elasticity firms with more  





















Marginal effect firms with  
less than 100 employees 
 
Marginal effect firms with  







Observations 11495  4850 
    
Note. Column 1: clustered standard errors in brackets; column 2: standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each regression includes a constant, regional, year and industry dummies, age, age 
squared, gender dummy, regional unemployment rate and the regional share of high tech firms, white 
collar job, education, part time and firm size dummies.  
   35
Table 7. Estimates of equation (5) using a negative binomial and of equation (4)  
by IV. Training variable: net training stock. 13 regions. 
 (1)  (2) 





    
Age  0.099*** 0.028***   
  [0.015] [0.006]   
Age squared  -0.001*** -0.000***   
  [0.000] [0.000]   
Gender  0.011 0.257***   
  [0.045] [0.018]   
    
Lagged incentives stock * 100  0.258***  
  [0.084]  
    
Net training stock   0.142** 
   [0.060] 
    
Regional unemployment rate (lagged)  -0.010** -0.008*** 
  [0.004] [0.002] 
% firms in high tech industries (lagged)  -0.094*** 0.026*** 
  [0.032] [0.010] 
    
Education: ISCED<3  0.612*** 0.056 
  [0.093] [0.035] 
Education: ISCED=3  0.884*** 0.097** 
  [0.085] [0.045] 
Education: ISCED>3  1.029*** 0.298*** 
  [0.128] [0.067] 
White collar job  0.312*** 0.087*** 
  [0.028] [0.022] 
Part time job  0.166** -0.386*** 
  [0.069] [0.024] 
Firm with less than 100 employees  -0.541*** -0.026 










    
Observations  11495 4850 
    
Note. Column 1: clustered robust standard errors in brackets; column 2: standard errors in brackets; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each regression includes a constant, regional, year and industry dummies, 
two parental education dummies and a dummy equal to 1 if firm size is missing. 
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Notes: the data are in million euro. ** issued on 29/12/2000 and thus imputed to 2001. 
 
 
  Law 236/93  Law 53/00 
Year  Act Resources  Act  Resources 
  First period: central administration 
1997 174/97  32  -  - 
37/98 65  -  -  1998 
139/98 102  -  - 
1999 51/99  85  -  - 
30/2000 77  -  -  2000 
92/00** 153  -  - 
  Second Period: regional autonomy 
2001  511/2001  92.9  167/01      30.9 
2002 -  -  -  - 
2003 296/03  50  -  - 
243/04  62.8  136/04     30.9  2004 
-  -  349/04     15.5 
2005 -  -  -  -   37
Table A2. Number of day between the national distribution of resource and the regional 
call for tenders (when issued) 
 296/03  243/04 
Piemonte 73  - 
Liguria 88  92 
Lombardia 250  - 
Bolzano *  230 
Trento 17  - 
Veneto 105  75 
Friuli V G  133  247 
Emilia Romagna  118  144 
Toscana 351  - 
Umbria 349  5 
Marche 259  159 
Lazio 484  140 
Abruzzo 467  123 
Molise 115  56 
Campania 407  133 
Puglia -  - 
Basilicata -  - 
Calabria -  - 
Sicilia -  - 
Sardegna 262  - 
Valle D’Aosta  -  - 
Average number of days  232  128 
*the resources were not used to finance CVT.   38
Table A3. ILFI number of interviews by waves 










Interview made in 
1997 
9759 7918 




(70% of the 
cases of 97) 
5944 
(61% of the 
cases of 97) 
5278 
(54% of the 
cases of 97) 
New cases 1999    720 New 
cases 
633 
(83% of the 
new cases of 
99 
552 
(775 of the 
new cases of 
99) 
497 
(69% of the 
new cases of 
99) 
New cases 2001      333 
New cases 
293 




(80% of the 
new cases of 
01) 
New cases 2003        319 
New cases 
280 
(88% of the 
new cases of 
03) 
New cases 2005          167 
New cases 
Number of 
interviews made in 
each wave 
9759 8638 7760 7108 6495 
Municipalities 
Sampled 
272 348 368 395 3.74 
Total number of 
cases in the 
database 
9759 10479  10812  11131  11298 
Source: ILFI, official documentation 2005   39
 
Table A4. Comparison between ILFI and Indagine Multiscopo (1997)  
   40
 
 
Figure 1. Stock of Regional Training Grants per Head. Years 1998-2005. Normalized to 
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Figure 4. Marginal returns to a week of training; depr. rate:0.15
 